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Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks minimum contacts 
in this case, it will bring about unfairness in cases where intentional 
torts are committed via the Internet . . . [w]e leave questions about 
virtual contacts for another day.1 
INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of August 31, 2014, a collection of 
celebrities, including famous actresses, models, and athletes, 
awoke to discover that their intimate and often explicit 
images had been posted across Internet message boards and 
other websites.2  All told, this widespread hack revealed the 
private lives of over 100 celebrities.3  Besides causing extreme 
embarrassment for those affected, the theft and distribution 
of the photographs thrust the threat of Internet torts into the 
spotlight and revealed the importance of providing adequate 
remedies to injured parties.  One of the affected, actress 
Jennifer Lawrence, described the hack as “disgusting,” noting 
“[t]he law needs to be changed, and we need to change.”4 
Though the laws may not be changed quickly, this Article 
anticipates that celebrities who had their photos released will 
bring lawsuits against the hackers under current laws.  
However, no matter how robust our state or national data 
privacy regimes become, they will provide no relief if would-
be defendants are beyond the jurisdiction of the American 
legal system.  While a great deal of research has been devoted 
to the study of civil litigation arising out of Internet contacts 
(often in the context of e-commerce),5 there is little research 
 
 1.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014). 
 2.  See, e.g., Rich McCormick, Hack Leaks Hundreds of Nude Celebrity 
Photos, THE VERGE (Sept. 1, 2014, 2:29 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/1/
6092089/nude-celebrity-hack. 
 3.  See McCormick, supra note 2. 
 4.  Sam Kashner, Both Huntress and Prey, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photo-hacking-
privacy. 
 5.  See, e.g., Sasha Segall, Jurisdictional Challenges in the United States 
Government’s Move to Cloud Computing Technology, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1105 (2013); Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the 
Law: Simplifying Personal Jurisdiction over Virtually Present Defendants, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 133, 150–51 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the 
Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated 
Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 80–85 (2006); Michael A. Geist, Is There a 
There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY 
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on the jurisdictional conditions precedent to making use of 
those laws in the tort context.6  This Article breaks new 
ground by considering the Supreme Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on specific personal jurisdiction in the case of 
Walden v. Fiore.  Specifically, this Article analyzes how the 
Walden decision complicates civil actionsparticularly 
against international defendantsarising out of torts 
committed through the Internet.  This Article exposes these 
challenges through the lens of the 2014 celebrity photo hack. 
Because data theft in the age of cloud computing disregards 
traditional notions of sovereignty and strains the current 
legal framework, the problem this Article poses will vex lower 
courts until Internet jurisdiction issues are provided greater 
clarity. 
In Part II, this Article introduces a hypothetical test case 
where one of the affected celebrities, Jennifer Lawrence,7 
attempts to press a tort claim in federal court in California 
for relief against an international defendant.  In Part III, this 
Article considers the 2014 Supreme Court decision in Walden 
v. Fiore, where the Court unanimously reaffirmed its 
commitment to the “minimum contacts” test of specific 
personal jurisdiction as a threshold for permitting suit 
against out-of-state defendants.8  The case recognized, but 
declined to resolve, the petitioners’ concerns that the 
reinforced rules might have implications for intentional torts 
perpetrated through the Internet.9  While the Court’s 
restraint is laudable, this Article argues that the lack of clear 
guidance on how to define specific personal jurisdiction in 
Internet torts in light of Walden has created a potential zone 
of ambiguous or non-existent personal jurisdiction, especially 
in the context of a suit against international defendants.  In 
Part IV, this Article applies the Walden decision to the facts 
of our hypothetical Lawrence case, revealing the weaknesses 
under the current jurisdictional framework.  Ultimately, this 
 
TECH. L.J. 1345, 1347–49 (2001). 
 6.  See, e.g., Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the 
Internet Has Misdirected the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction 
Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 574–75 (2009). 
 7.  See, e.g., Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Leak, PEOPLE (Aug. 31, 
2014), http://www.people.com/article/jennifer-lawrence-nude-photos. 
 8.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014). 
 9.  Id. at 1125, n. 9. 
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Article concludes in Part V by exploring potential remedies to 
this gap in the jurisdictional jurisprudence. 
I. TEST CASE: 2014 CELEBRITY PHOTO HACK 
In August 2014, hackers released to the public a cache of 
stolen images of over 100 celebrities on passive image hosting 
websites.10  While there is no certain theory on how the 
images were stolen and the project is believed to be the work 
of many different individuals working independently,11 it is 
widely accepted that hackers obtained the images remotely by 
accessing phone data over the Internet that was stored in 
Apple data centers.12  One of those celebrities acutely affected 
by the hack was Jennifer Lawrence.13  This Article considers 
a hypothetical (but very probable) sequence of events 
surrounding Lawrence’s attempt to sue those who stole and 
shared her photographs for civil damages. 
A. Data Storage in the Cloud: Locating the Source of 
the Theft 
In order to develop this hypothetical, a working 
understanding of how Internet data in “the cloud” is stored 
and accessed is a fundamental first step.  “The cloud” is an 
evolution in Internet usage towards centralized off-site 
computing systems and Internet-based storage.14  This 
process permits devices with limited storage to access large 
amounts of data stored offsite.15  Examples include Google 
Docs and Gmail16 as well as Apple’s iCloud,17 the database 
 
 10.  See McCormick, supra note 2. 
 11.  See, e.g., James Vincent, Nude Celebrity Photo Hacks the Work of an 




 12.  See Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Leak, supra note 7; see also 
Justin Worland, How That Massive Celebrity Hack Might Have Happened, TIME 
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://time.com/3247717/jennifer-lawrence-hacked-icloud-
leaked/. 
 13.  See Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Leak, supra note 7. 
 14.  See David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure 
3.0?, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 190, 195 (2012). 
 15.  Maamar Ferkoun, Top 7 Most Common Uses of Cloud Computing, 
I.B.M. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://thoughtsoncloud.com/2014/02/top-7-most-common-
uses-of-cloud-computing/. 
 16.  Lametti, supra note 14, at 209. 
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from which the stolen photographs were drawn.  Databases 
like these, which offer access over the Internet to stored 
content, depend on large, centralized storage “data centers.”18  
The increased use of cloud services has led to a subsequent 
increase in the construction of large-scale data centers around 
the world to house that information.19  Though the data is 
always accessible on mobile devices, it is stored locally at the 
data center (in addition to possibly being stored locally on the 
user’s device).20  By way of example, the music-streaming 
program Spotify provides users the option of downloading 
music for offline consumption.21  Otherwise, the music is 
available over an Internet connection by streaming it directly 
through the company’s program.22  In either case, the music is 
accessed from physical storage on site at Spotify’s data 
centers in Stockholm, London, Ashburn, or San Jose 
(whichever is closest to the location of the user.).23  As a 
result, a person looking to access Spotify’s music does so by 
tapping the physical information held in the nearest data 
 
 17.  iCloud Drive, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2014) (“[W]ith iCloud Drive, you can safely store all your documents in iCloud 
and access them from your iPhone, iPad, iPod touch, Mac, or even PC.”). 
 18.  Paul Stryer, Understanding Data Centers and Cloud Computing, 
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE WHITE PAPERS (2010),  http://www.globalknowledge.nl/
content/files/documents/White-Papers/Cloud-Computing-White-Paper-Unders
tanding-Data-Centers (“A data center (sometimes called a server farm) is a 
centralized repository for the storage, management, and dissemination of data 
and information.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Vanessa Desloires, IBM Opens Data Centre in Melbourne to 
Capture Cloud Demand, FINANCIAL REVIEW (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.afr.com
/p/technology/ibm_opens_data_centre_in_melbourne_8EJHXPvO6ftTZmDYfahS
YP; Penny Jones, U.S. Cloud Providers Lead EU Demand for Data Centers, 
DATA CENTER DYNAMICS (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/
focus/archive/2014/03/us-cloud-providers-lead-eu-demand-data-centers; Rich 
Miller, Cloud Growth Spurs Demand for Data Centers, DATA CENTER 
KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/
2012/03/12/cloud-growth-spurs-demand-for-data-centers/. 
 20.  See Zuzanna Blaszkiewicz, What You Need to Know About Syncing 
Photos in iCloud, SOFTONIC (Oct. 22, 2014), http://features.en.softonic.com/what
-you-need-to-know-about-syncing-photos-in-icloud. 
 21.  Listen Offline, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/us/learn-more/guide
s/#!/article/Listen-offline (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 22.  Farhad Manjoo, The World’s Greatest Music Service, SLATE (July 16, 
2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2009/07/the_worlds_
greatest_music_service.html. 
 23.  David Poblador I. Garcia, Spotify: Data Center & Backend Buildout, 
SPOTIFY (July 10, 2013), http://www.slideshare.net/davidpoblador/spotify-bcn20
13slideshare. 
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center. 
Some liberties must be taken with the hypothetical at 
this juncture.  At the time that Jennifer Lawrence’s photos 
were stolen, it appears that all of Apple’s iCloud data was 
stored in U.S. data centers in California and North 
Carolina.24  Were it the case that the data was stolen from a 
U.S. data-center, personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
would likely be proper in the state containing the breached 
data center.25  However, foreign-based digital theft of 
American information is an increasing problem.26  Companies 
like Google and Microsoft, which are also victimized by data 
theft, store their data in centers in other countries.27  In 
addition, Apple has announced that it will be expanding its 
data center servers into other countries including Curacao, 
the Netherlands, and China.28  Furthermore, it is 
hypothetically possible that some of the data at issue was 
stolen from foreign data servers owned by third party 
application providers who store data for Apple.29  Therefore, it 
 
 24.  See, e.g., Apple Insider Staff, Apple to Build Second “Tactical 
Datacenter” at Maiden, NC Facility, APPLE INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/14/02/20/apple-to-build-second-tactical-
datacenter-at-maiden-nc-facility; Rich Miller, Apple Buys California Data 
Center, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.datacenterknow
ledge.com/archives/2006/02/27/apple-buys-california-data-center/. 
 25.  See MacDermid v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that 
defendant was subject to jurisdiction in Connecticut because she accessed 
servers there to steal confidential information).  However, this ruling does not 
mean that the question of who has jurisdiction is completely settled.  See 
Damon Andrews & John Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
the Cloud, 73 MD L. REV. 358, 361 (2013).  The hypothetical in this article is 
stretched to focus on the international defendant because it presents unique 
challenges that are certain to arise in time even if they do not apply directly to 
Jennifer Lawrence’s circumstances. 
 26.  Martin Giles, Defending the Digital Frontier, THE ECONOMIST (July 12, 
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21606416-companies-mar
kets-and-countries-are-increasingly-under-attack-cyber-criminals. 
 27.  Google data center locations are available at: http://www.google.com/ab
out/datacenters/inside/locations/; Microsoft centers are located at: http://www.
microsoft.com/online/legal/v2/en-us/MOS_PTC_Geo_Boundaries.htm. 
 28.  Neil Hughes, Apple Reportedly Expanding Global Data Center Presence 
with New Facility in Curacao, APPLE INSIDER (Aug. 16, 2014), http://appleinside
r.com/articles/14/08/16/apple-reportedly-expanding-global-data-center-presence-
with-new-facility-in-curacao. 
 29.  According to Apple’s privacy provisions, the company “shares personal 
information with companies who provide services such as . . . managing and 
enhancing customer data . . . .” “These companies are obligated to protect your 
information and may be located wherever Apple operates.” Apple Privacy Policy, 
01_SCHILDKNECHT FINAL 12/20/2015  10:02 PM 
2016] JUSTICE FOR J-LAW?  7 
is likely in the futureif it is not already truethat users 
who have had their data stolen will be forced to pursue their 
action against a foreign defendant who obtained the 
information from a foreign data center.  This hypothetical will 
incorporate some of these developing trends to demonstrate 
the difficulties that will arise in bringing civil claims over 
breaches of foreign data centers. 
B. Jennifer Lawrence’s Hypothetical Litigation 
Suppose that Jennifer Lawrence decides to bring legal 
action against those who injured her by stealing and 
releasing her photos.30  Further assume that research by 
Lawrence’s attorneys reveals that her stolen photographs 
were stored at Apple’s data center in the Netherlands.  The 
data was stored at the Netherlands data center because it 
was the nearest data center when the photos were uploaded 
to the cloud while Lawrence was on set in Europe for the 
filming of a new movie.31  After taking the pictures and 
uploading them to the cloud (unbeknownst to Lawrence, to be 
stored at the Dutch data center), she returned home to 
California, and it was there that she became aware that the 
photos had been stolen in the intervening period.  In addition, 
the lawyers discover that the individual who stole Lawrence’s 
photos from iCloud committed his nefarious acts from a 
computer terminal in Russia.32  The individual has never 
 
APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
 30.  In fact Lawrence has already sought legal representation to remove 
images posted on the Internet pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.  See, e.g., TMZ Staff, Jennifer Lawrence Non-Selfie Nudes Could Pose Legal 
Hurdle, TMZ (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.tmz.com/2014/09/03/jennifer-lawrence-
nude-photos-leak-hacked-copyright/. 
 31.  Data is often uploaded and stored to servers that are nearest to the 
location of the uploader to facilitate quick data uploads and downloads.  See In 
re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp., 13 MAG. 2814, 2014 WL 1661004 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2014), at 
*2 (“[W]here a particular user’s information is stored depends in part on a 
phenomenon known as ‘network latency’; because the quality of service 
decreases the farther a user is from the datacenter where his account is hosted, 
efforts are made to assign each account to the closest datacenter.”). 
 32.  Russia was chosen because of the limited international cooperation 
between the countries and because of the high incidence of cyber-theft in the 
country.  See, e.g., Jeremy Bender, Report: Russian Cyber Crime Syndicate 
Linked to Neiman Marcus Theft, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/neiman-marcus-cyber-attack-russian-hackers-
2014-4. 
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visited the United States and does not engage in any business 
with the United States.  Though the pictures of Lawrence 
were accessible to Internet users in the United States and 
around the world, the thief hosted the images on Russian 
servers with a Russian domain name. 
Because Lawrence is a California resident and the 
defendant is a foreign national, Lawrence’s attorneys file suit 
in the Federal District Court for the Central District of 
California based on diversity jurisdiction.33  Among other 
causes of action,34 Lawrence’s attorneys rely on: (1) California 
Penal Code section 502(e)(1), which provides civil remedies 
against any person who knowingly takes, makes use of, or 
copies data without permission from a computer or network;35 
and (2) a common law claim for invasion of privacy for the 
public disclosure of private events.36 
 
 33.  “California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, ‘is 
coextensive with federal due process requirements, [so] the jurisdictional 
analyses under state law and federal due process are the same’.” CollegeSource, 
Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
 34.  For the sake of brevity, this Article focuses on two representative 
claims and does not investigate related questions about whether Lawrence has 
satisfied the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction or venue. 
 35.  Section 502 reads in relevant part: 
§ 502. Unauthorized access to computers, computer systems and 
computer data. 
 (c) Except as provided in subdivision (h), any person who commits 
any of the following acts is guilty of a public offense: 
(2) Knowingly accesses and without permission takes, copies, 
or makes use of any data from a computer, computer system, 
or computer network, or takes or copies any supporting 
documentation, whether existing or residing internal or 
external to a computer, computer system, or computer 
network. 
(e)(1) In addition to any other civil remedy available, the owner or 
lessee of the computer, computer system, computer network, 
computer program, or data who suffers damage or loss by reason of 
a violation of any of the provisions of subdivision (c) may bring a 
civil action against the violator for compensatory damages and 
injunctive relief or other equitable relief. Cal. Pen. Code § 502. 
 36.  The elements of a claim of invasion of privacy based on the public 
disclosure of private facts are as follows: “(1) public disclosure (2) of a private 
fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and 
(4) which is not of legitimate public concern.”  Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. 
Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th 856, 868 (2010), as modified on denial of 
reh’g (Mar. 1, 2010) (quoting Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 
200, 214 (1998)). 
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Lawrence’s attorneys believe that the defendant has not 
had “such continuous and systematic contacts as to be at 
home in”37 Californiaa threshold requirement to establish 
general personal jurisdictionso they decide instead to focus 
their proof of personal jurisdiction on specific jurisdiction 
based on defendant’s conduct in the forum state.38  In their 
pleadings, Lawrence’s attorneys maintain that personal 
jurisdiction is proper based on a number of arguments.  First, 
the defendant targeted the district by accessing the digital 
information owned by Apple in that district.  Second, the 
defendant directed his efforts at the district by operating a 
website which hosts her images and which is accessible to 
residents of that district.  Third, the defendant knew that 
Lawrence resided in California and therefore the distribution 
of the pictures would cause harm to her in that state. 
The defendant maintains that he is not subject to specific 
jurisdiction in the United States.  First, he argues that the 
data was not stolen from Apple’s data centers within the 
district but from a data center located outside of U.S. 
jurisdiction.39  Second, he argues that the website through 
which he has made the pictures available was set up and is 
maintained in his home country and is accessible to anyone, 
anywhere with an Internet connection.  Third, he claims that 
he did not specifically target Jennifer Lawrence with his 
efforts and that his distribution of the images was not 
intended to cause harm to her or anyone else but merely to 
make information available to people everywhere.  Therefore, 
the defendant would argue that he has not targeted residents 




 37.  See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (citations 
omitted); see also CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1074 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“AcademyOne’s alleged misappropriation of CollegeSource’s 
intellectual property does not support general jurisdiction because the 
misappropriation was not a ‘continuous and systematic’ forum activity, but was, 
rather, a few discrete acts over a relatively short period of time.”). 
 38.  “Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe decision 
have differentiated between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or 
case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 
S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 
 39.  See infra Section II.a. 
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II. JURISDICTION FOR INTERNET TORTS:                    
EXISTING CASE LAW 
“Absent one of the traditional bases for personal 
jurisdiction (presence, domicile, or consent), due process 
requires that the defendant have certain ‘minimum contacts’ 
with the forum state, ‘such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”40  There is no Supreme Court precedent governing 
the application of jurisdiction in Internet torts. In 2014, the 
Court was asked to visit this issue in Walden v. Fiore but 
declined to rule on the matter.41  Nevertheless, Walden and a 
patchwork of related case law provide the analytical 
framework for determining how and where jurisdiction could 
be properly exerted over the data thief in Lawrence’s 
hypothetical litigation.  Part A of this section explores the 
Walden decision in detail, particularly how it re-asserted the 
primacy of the minimum contacts test as a defendant-friendly 
tool to obstruct aggressive application of personal 
jurisdiction.42  Through its discussion of Walden, Part A also 
analyzes the Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, which 
articulated an alternative “effects test” for personal 
jurisdiction, but which may have been significantly cabined 
by the Walden decision.43  Part B considers the role of another 
seminal personal jurisdiction decision based on Internet 
usage, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
which considered how the use of a website can create 
minimum contacts with a forum state.44  While the 
unanimous nature of the Walden decision suggests a level of 
obviousness in the legal reasoning,45 when the decision is 
weaved together with Calder and Zippo, the legal fabric fails 
to cover important Internet torts like the photo theft in our 
hypothetical. 
 
 40.  Mainstream Media, EC v. Riven, C 08-3623 PJH, 2009 WL 2157641, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2009) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945)). 
 41.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014). 
 42.  Id. at 1121–22. 
 43.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 44.  See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 
(W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 45.  William Baude, Opinion Analysis: The Boundaries of Specific 
Jurisdiction, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2014/02/opinion-analysis-the-boundaries-of-specific-jurisdiction/. 
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A. Walden v. Fiore 
In 2014, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that in order 
to satisfy the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction 
a plaintiff must show that the defendant herself has 
established connections to the forum state.46  The Court held 
that where the relevant conduct occurred outside of the forum 
state, the fact that a defendant’s conduct affected a plaintiff 
connected to the forum state was insufficient to establish 
jurisdiction.47 
1. Facts 
In 2006, TSA agents at the San Juan airport searched 
the carry-on bags of Gina Fiore and her travel companion as 
they attempted to board a plane to Atlanta.48  Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents detained the 
travelers after discovering $97,000 in cash in the luggage.49  
Fiore informed agents in San Juan that the cash was the 
winnings and bankroll for a gambling trip to a local casino, 
that the travelers were professional gamblers, and that they 
maintained residency in California and Nevada.50  Fiore and 
her companion were allowed to board the flight but the San 
Juan agents contacted their counterparts in Atlanta, who 
subsequently detained the travelers upon their arrival in 
Atlanta.51  In Atlanta, DEA agent Walden seized the cash and 
informed Fiore that the money “would be returned if they 
later proved a legitimate source for the cash.”52  The travelers 
subsequently boarded the last leg of their flight to Nevada.53 
Following the seizure, agent Walden helped draft an 
affidavit showing probable cause for the forfeiture of the 
funds and forwarded the affidavit to the United States 
Attorney’s Office in Georgia.54  Ultimately, the Department of 
Justice did not seek forfeiture and returned the funds in 
 
 46.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122. 
 47.  Id. at 1126. 
 48.  Id. at 1119–20. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 1119. 
 52.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
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2007.55  Nevertheless, Fiore and her companion brought a 
Bivens action in federal court in Nevada alleging that they 
had been injured because: (1) the seizure lacked probable 
cause; (2) the DEA withheld the money after concluding that 
it was not drug-related; and (3) because Walden had drafted 
and forwarded an affidavit purportedly based on false 
statements.56 
2. Procedural History 
The District Court in Nevada granted Walden’s motion to 
dismiss, reasoning that even if Walden caused harm to 
plaintiffs in Nevada while knowing that they were living in 
Nevada, this could not confer jurisdiction on its own.57  
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that while the 
seizure in Georgia could not form the basis of personal 
jurisdiction, the purportedly false affidavit could establish 
jurisdiction because it was expressly aimed at Nevada and 
Walden knew that it would affect persons with a significant 
connection to Nevada.58 
3. Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walden v. Fiore 
to address “the ‘minimum contacts’ necessary to create 
specific jurisdiction.”59  The Supreme Court emphasized two 
particular considerations in determining whether specific 
personal jurisdiction existed. First, “the relationship must 
arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with 
the forum State.”60  Second, the minimum contacts test is 
based on the defendant’s contact with the forum state itself, 
not with the persons who reside there.61 
The Supreme Court held that the facts in Walden did not 
satisfy these standards: 
It is undisputed that no part of petitioner’s course of 
conduct occurred in Nevada. Petitioner approached, 
questioned, and searched respondents, and seized the cash 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119. 
 58.  Id. at 1120. 
 59.  Id. at 1121. 
 60.  Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985)). 
 61.  Id. at 1122. 
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at issue, in the Atlanta airport.  It is alleged that 
petitioner later helped draft a “false probable cause 
affidavit” in Georgia and forwarded that affidavit to a 
United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia to support a 
potential action for forfeiture of the seized funds.  
Petitioner never traveled to, conducted activities within, 
contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to 
Nevada.  In short, when viewed through the proper lens—
whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the 
forum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant 
contacts with Nevada.62 
Respondents argued that the case was analogous to 
Calder v. Jones.63  In Calder, the Supreme Court held that 
personal jurisdiction existed over Florida newspaper writers 
in California state court for libel.64  The writers contributed to 
a national newspaper with a circulation greater than 600,000 
in California, where the celebrity who was the subject of the 
article claimed injury.65  The writers also contacted sources in 
the state of California and one of the defendants regularly 
traveled to California on business.66  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court held that jurisdiction over the Florida defendants was 
proper in California: 
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California 
activities of a California resident.  It impugned the 
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career 
was centered in California.  The article was drawn from 
California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms 
both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to 
her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In 
sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of 
the harm suffered.  Jurisdiction over petitioners is 
therefore proper in California based on the “effects” of 
their Florida conduct in California.67 
However, the Court in Walden rejected this comparison.68 
The Court reinforced that “mere injury to a forum resident is 
 
 62.  Id. at 1124. (citations omitted). 
 63.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 
(1984). 
 64.  Calder, 465 U.S. at 785. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 788–89. 
 68.  Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125 (“This emphasis [on Calder] is likewise 
misplaced.”). 
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not a sufficient connection to the forum.”69 Therefore, the 
“proper question” is not where the plaintiff experienced injury 
but instead whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to 
the forum in a meaningful way.70  The Court concluded that 
the seizure of goods in Georgia caused an injury that was 
forum-agnostic: “Respondents would have experienced this 
same lack of access in California, Mississippi, or wherever 
else they might have traveled and found themselves wanting 
more money than they had.”71  In fact, the Court intimated 
that the Calder test may be limited to claims like defamation 
where intentional harm in the forum state is a component of 
the cause of action.72  For this reason, Walden may portend a 
more limited application of the Calder doctrine. 
At the end of the opinion, the court provided addressed 
the respondent’s concerns about the consequences of this 
decision on Internet torts: 
Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks 
minimum contacts in this case, it will bring about 
unfairness in cases where intentional torts are committed 
via the Internet or other electronic means . . . we reiterate 
that the “minimum contacts” inquiry principally protects 
the liberty of the nonresident defendant, not the interests 
of the plaintiff.  In any event, this case does not present 
the very different questions whether and how a 
defendant’s virtual “presence” and conduct translate into 
“contacts” with a particular State. To the contrary, there 
is no question where the conduct giving rise to this 
litigation took place . . . [w]e leave questions about virtual 
contacts for another day.73 
This reveals two important themes of the Walden 
opinion.  First, it reinforces the Court’s belief that personal 
jurisdiction is to be construed in favor of the defendant, not 
for the benefit of the plaintiff.  Second, it shows that, if 
possible, the Court will look to the location where the conduct 
took place when determining jurisdiction rather than relying 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 1124 (“The strength of that connection [to the forum] was largely 
a function of the nature of the libel tort.  However scandalous a newspaper 
article might be, it can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to (and 
read and understood by) third persons.”). 
 73.  Id. at 1125, n. 9 (citations omitted). 
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on the location of the injured party.  Both of these themes 
have important implications for data theft cases. 
B. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.: Publication 
to a Website as a Basis of Jurisdiction 
The “Zippo test” has been widely adopted by the circuits 
as a means to determine whether an Internet portal 
accessible in the forum state can create jurisdiction in the 
forum state.74  In Zippo, the district court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania held that whether a website can 
establish jurisdiction in a forum depends on the level of 
contacts that the website creates with the forum state.75  The 
court held that “[a]t one end of the spectrum are situations 
where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet”: 
these business transactions satisfy the requirements of 
specific jurisdiction.76  Similarly, “[i]f the defendant enters 
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that 
involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer 
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.”77  On 
the other hand, “where a defendant has simply posted 
information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to 
users in foreign jurisdictions,” jurisdiction over that 
defendant is not proper.78  Stated another way, “a passive 
Web site that does little more than make information 
available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”79  This standard has 
provided jurisdiction in a wide range of cases where 
defendants only interaction with the forum state was through 
 
 74.  See Michael A. Geist, Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1367–71 (2001) (collecting and 
discussing cases adopting Zippo); William H. Wynne, Roads? Where We’re Going 
We Don’t Need Roads: Back to the Future and the Ninth Circuit’s Use of 
Traditional Jurisdiction on the Internet Superhighway, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
477 (2012). See also Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 251 (2d Cir. 
2007); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003); ALS 
Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(collectively adopting the Zippo standard). 
 75.  See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–25 
(W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 76.  Id. at 1124. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
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a website.80 
III. APPLICATIONS AND AMBIGUITIES POST-WALDEN 
Having established the present contours of specific 
personal jurisdiction for Internet torts, this section returns to 
the specific circumstances of the hypothetical.  When a 
defendant is domiciled internationally, can he be subject to 
personal jurisdiction for the theft and distribution of a U.S. 
citizen’s data?  There are three potential sources of personal 
jurisdiction in the hypothetical case.  First, as discussed in 
Part A, the availability in California of images of Jennifer 
Lawrence on a passive Internet site may establish 
jurisdiction in California. Second, as discussed in Part B, the 
underlying theft of the photo data from a foreign server 
creates jurisdiction in California because the plaintiff is a 
California resident.  Third, as discussed in Part C, the theft 
and distribution of the images creates jurisdiction because 
the effect of the actions were knowingly targeted at 
California.  The first question implicates the Zippo reasoning, 
which nevertheless must be viewed in light of the Walden 
decision.  The second case also implicates Walden because 
there are strong comparisons to be made between the seizure 
in that case and the theft of Internet data which routinely 
travels between different repositories.  Finally, the third basis 
is rooted in the Calder “effects” test.  However, that test may 
no longer carry the same force following the Walden decision. 
Each of these bases will be considered in turn. 
A. Internet Availability as Basis for Jurisdiction 
Zippo’s reliance on interactivity likely renders the rule 
unfit to litigate the publication of Jennifer Lawrence’s photos. 
The Zippo sliding scale is based on the interactivity of the 
website.81  But hackers initially posted the celebrity photos on 
passive image sites including 4chan and Reddit.82  These sites 
 
 80.  John J. Schulze, Jr., Caveat E-Emptor: Solutions to the Jurisdictional 
Problem of Internet Injury, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 619–24 (2006) (listing 
applications of the Zippo test based on website contacts). 
 81.  See infra Section III.B. 
 82.  Harry Bradford, Everything We Know About The Unnamed Celebrity 
Photo Hacker, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/09/02/celebrity-photo-hacker_n_5752642.html (noting that the photos 
are believed to have been first uploaded to the Internet via relatively obscure 
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are intentionally austere message boards with limited 
interactivity besides the ability to post content or to view 
comments or images posted by others.83  Neither website is 
interactive in the sense contemplated by the court in Zippo 
because the sites do not provide any opportunity for viewers 
in California to purchase or engage directly with a product on 
the website.84  More apropos than engaging with products, the 
Zippo standard excludes online advertisements as a basis for 
jurisdiction because of its passivity.85  The hosting of the 
images in this case is even less interactive than many modern 
advertisements.86 
The Supreme Court of California considered a close 
example to the our Lawrence hypothetical in Pavlovich v. 
Superior Court.87  In that case, a website operator residing in 
Indiana posted a computer program which could decrypt 
DVDs produced by a California corporation.88  After 
determining that Pavlovich did not himself have any 
connection to California,89 the court employed the Zippo scale 
and found that the passive hosting website did not create 
jurisdiction in California.90  Just as the code at issue in 
Pavlovich could be used to tortiously breach the security of 
the DVDs, those who download Jennifer Lawrence’s pictures 
can use them to commit tortious conduct by causing her 
emotional distress and further invading her privacy.  
Nevertheless, Pavlovich seems to support the notion that 
even when content could be used for nefarious purposes, the 
 
forums like 4Chan and AnonIB, but that they were shared more widely after 
the creation of a Reddit community). 
 83.  See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming a 
district court ruling that a “Zippo-passive” website could not create specific 
personal jurisdiction). 
 84.  See, e.g., Wynne, supra note 74, at 491 (finding that the Zippo standard 
“encompasses direct commercial activity or the selling of a physical product to 
an end-user, but notably excludes Internet advertising.”). 
 85.  See Wynne, supra note 74.  But see Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., 
Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1227–31 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the interactivity 
standard in favor of a focus on purposeful availment). 
 86.  Hairong Li & John D. Leckenby, Internet Advertising Formats and 
Effectiveness (Oct. 2004), available at http://champtec.googlepages.com/ad_form
at_print.pdf (finding an increase in advertising based on rich media and 
keyword searches and a decline in passive banner and sponsorship advertising). 
 87.  Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262 (2002). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 274. 
 90.  Id. 
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person hosting it is not subject to jurisdiction in the injured 
party’s state just because they made the information 
available. 
Even if a broad reading of interactivity might capture the 
conduct in our Lawrence hypothetical, the effect would 
swallow the rule and lead to unsatisfactory jurisdictional 
outcomes.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in Cybersell, Inc. v. 
Cybersell, Inc., assertion of jurisdiction based on mere posting 
or hosting of content would establish precedent whereby 
“every complaint arising . . . on the Internet would 
automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever the 
plaintiff’s principal place of business is located.”91  Similarly, 
the Tenth Circuit has emphasized that the analysis should 
focus on the intentional direction of activities at the forum 
state rather than the mere accessibility of those activities in 
that state.92 
The passive hosting as a basis for jurisdiction rejected in 
Zippo has similarly failed to catch fire in the European 
Union. While EU regulations “potentially subject all cloud 
services used by an EU resident to the EU’s data protection 
law”93 the European Court of Justice held in the case of In re 
Lindqvist, that the rule should not be read broadly to impose 
jurisdiction in every member state over a website that 
contained some private information.94  The Court noted that if 
posting information on a website constituted a transfer of 
data to all countries where that webpage could be accessed 
then EU Member States would actually be discouraged from 
permitting any posting because information may be 
transferred to a country that will not adequately protect the 
posted data according to EU law.95  The European Court’s 
reasoning comports with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Cybersell finding that it would be absurd and incongruous to 
subject a website owner to jurisdiction in any location where 
the website was accessed.96  
 
 91.  Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 92.  See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F. 3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 93.  See Paul Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1623, 1650 (2013). 
 94.  In re Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, 2003 E.C.R. I-13020, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=48382&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=EN. 
 95.  Id. at I-13020. 
 96.  See Schwartz, supra note 93, at 1650–51. 
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Whether or not an expansive Zippo-like test could lead to 
desirable legal outcomes, a viewpoint rejected by American 
and European courts, such an approach seems foreclosed by 
the Court’s Walden decision, which required defendant-
specific contacts and rejected incidental contacts with 
plaintiff’s forum.97 
B. Data Seizure as Basis for Jurisdiction 
The seizure of the data itself presents a second avenue 
for obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant.  One could argue 
that because the data was stored concomitant on Lawrence’s 
phone and at Apple’s data centers, that the theft of the data 
occurred on that phone and  thus jurisdiction is found 
wherever that phone was at the time of the hack.  However, 
“cloud computing is necessarily (and perhaps counter-
intuitively) ‘grounded’ by aggregated servers on land or in 
water.”98  Therefore, when an individual like the hypothetical 
defendant breaks into a server, they are perpetrating an act 
at a physical location where the data is stored even if the fruit 
of those efforts is information otherwise contained on a 
person’s private device.  A few courts have grappled with the 
issue of personal jurisdiction where a person takes 
information from a remote data server.99  In these cases, 
courts have generally held that minimum contacts exist in 
the state where the data was stolen.100  While this viewpoint 
comports with both a Calder analysis and a traditional 
minimum contacts analysis, no court has faced this question 
with respect to non-U.S. data storage.  Nevertheless, a few 
decisions have considered the legal implications of theft from 
 
 97.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). 
 98.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 360. 
 99.  See, e.g., Rhapsody Solutions, LLC v. Cryogenic Vessel Alternatives, 
Inc., 2013 WL 820589, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (finding jurisdiction in 
forum state based on non-resident defendant’s access of a company’s forum state 
servers); see also Watch Sys. LLC v. Sys. Design Solutions, Inc., Civ. A. No. 09–
5821, 2009 WL 5217085, at *6 (E.D.La. Dec.31, 2009); Abatix Corp. v. Capra, 
No. Civ. A. 2:07–CV–541, 2008 WL 4427285, *4 (E.D.Tex. Sept.24, 2008); 
Flowserve Corp. v. Midwest Pipe Repair, L.L.C., No. 3:05-CV-1357-N, 2006 WL 
265521, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2006); Info. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. ITI of N. Fla., 
Inc., No. 01 C 4668, 2001 WL 1516750, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Nov.28, 2001); Peridyne 
Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 
1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 100.  Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1951, 1955–56 (2005). 
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a server in an unknown location, a realistic problem 
considering the decentralized and cross-border nature of 
cloud storage and a challenge in light of the Walden Court’s 
distaste for random or fortuitous jurisdictional hooks.101 
In MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, the Second Circuit held 
that a Canadian employee of a Connecticut company was 
subject to specific jurisdiction in Connecticut after stealing 
company documents from a server physically located in 
Connecticut.102  The court analyzed the data theft under the 
Calder “intentionally directed efforts” rather than treating 
the theft of data like the car accident in Worldwide 
Volkswagen.  The Second Circuit found that while “[m]ost 
Internet users, perhaps, have no idea of the location of the 
servers through which they send their emails,” this particular 
defendant “knew that the email servers she used and the 
confidential files she misappropriated were both located in 
Connecticut.”103  A district court in Kansas in AgJunction 
LLC v. Agragrian Inc. adopted the same logic in denying 
jurisdiction where a defendant did not know that the data he 
was stealing was specifically stored on servers in the forum 
state as opposed to other states in which the plaintiff had 
data centers.104  The court in AgJunction went further, 
applying the holding in Walden and declaring, “the fact that 
the files were stored in Kansas is the type of ‘random, 
fortuitous, or attenuated’ contact that does not satisfy due 
process.”105 
Even within the same courtroom, defendant’s knowledge 
of server location has prompted divergent dispositions.  In 
two near identical cases, Microsoft Corp. v. Mountain W. 
Computers, Inc. and  Microsoft Corp. v. Communications & 
Data Systems Consultants, Inc. in the Western District of 
Washington, contrary motion to dismiss resolutions turned on 
whether the defendant’s knew they were targeting servers in 
Washington when committing alleged tortious acts.106  In the 
 
 101.  See Walden, 571 U.S. at 8. 
 102.  MacDermid v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 727. 
 103.  Id. at 730. 
 104.  AgJunction LLC v. Agrian Inc., 14-CV-2069-DDC-KGS, 2014 WL 
3361728 (D. Kan. July 9, 2014). 
 105.  Id. at *5. 
 106.  Microsoft Corp. v. Mountain W. Computers, Inc., No. C14-1772RSM, 
2015 WL 4479490 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2015); Microsoft Corp. v. Commc’ns & 
Data Sys. Consultants, Inc., No. C15-0497 RSM, 2015 WL 5102587 (W.D. Wash. 
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first case, Mountain W., the court found that it had specific 
jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims against a 
small IT company in Utah, because “Defendants affirmatively 
contacted Microsoft through internet contact with its servers” 
and “they knew Microsoft is located in Washington.”107  The 
court reached this conclusion “regardless of whether 
Defendants knew where Plaintiff’s servers were located.”108 
Two months later, the same court dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction a claim against a small computer reseller in 
Indiana because “Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that 
the servers accessed by the instant Defendant are located in 
Washington.”109  As this Article has advised, and other courts, 
as in AgJunction have recognized, courts must take care to 
not conflate the location of the company itself with the 
location of its data servers.  Failing to take heed, the 
Mountain W. court disregarded the prevalence of off-site (and 
out of state) data storage while smoothing over the challenge 
this disconnect poses for establishing specific jurisdiction. 
Taken together, these decisions illustrate the significant 
challenges Lawrence would face in asserting jurisdiction over 
a foreign defendant based on the location of the data seizure.  
First, the defendant could argue that even if the data was 
stored on a server or on Lawrence’s phone in California, that 
fact is merely fortuitous and cannot form the basis of 
jurisdiction because defendant, like those in AgJunction and 
Communications and Data Systems, Inc., did  not know the 
location of the targeted data.110  Even if, as in MacDermaid 
and Mountain W., the court found that the defendant knew or 
should have known of the location of the servers, he may still 
be able to argue that jurisdiction is only proper where the 
server is located, a conclusion supported by pre and post-
Walden case law.111  If the server were in another U.S. state, 
 
Aug. 28, 2015); The court in Mountain W. also considered the defendant’s 
purchase of Microsoft software from a third party vendor based in Washington 
to establish specific jurisdiction. See Mountain W., 2015 WL 4479490 at *7.  
While such a fact could have been dispositive on its own, the court presents the 
server access as an independent basis for establishing jurisdiction.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at *7–8 . 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Commc’ns & Data Sys. Consultants, Inc., WL 5102587 at *7. 
 110.  See id.; see also AgJunction, 2014 WL 3361728 . 
 111.  See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th 
Cir.1996) (pre-Walden); AgJunction, 2014 WL 3361728 (post-Walden). 
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jurisdiction and venue would likely be proper in that state 
(even if local law might be less favorable).   But if the server 
is housed abroad, then jurisdiction would not be proper in any 
U.S. state.  Furthermore, the notion that Lawrence should be 
drawn out of her favorable jurisdiction to litigate in North 
Carolina or some other state where Apple stored her data 
seems no more equitable than hailing the defendant into a 
forum in which he has no contacts. 
C. Calder “Effects” Test as Basis for Jurisdiction 
Walden may have significantly cabined the viability of 
the Calder doctrine and consequently reduced its usefulness 
in our hypothetical case.  The Supreme Court suggested this 
very possibility when they ruled that Calder may be limited 
to the exceptional nature of the libel tort action, which 
requires a person to affect individuals in the jurisdiction.112  
Other courts have speculated that the Walden decision will 
limit the effectiveness of Calder.113  If Calder is limited, its 
limitation is to tort actions that by their very nature require 
contacts with the forum state.114  Lawrence’s best argument 
may be that the release of private facts tort is analogous to 
libel in that it requires a recipient in order to have effect.  The 
significance of the photo hack was a function of the many 
people (including those in California) who viewed the images.  
Because the hacker knew or should have known that the 
effect would be most pronounced in California where 
Lawrence lives, the Calder effects test would render this an 
appropriate basis for personal jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, there are marked differences between the 
facts in Calder and the circumstances in this hypothetical.  In 
Calder, the court made note of the fact that the publication 
had its most extensive circulation in the state of California.115  
Therefore, the writers for the paper were on notice that the 
 
 112.  See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123–24 (2014). 
 113.  See Streamline Bus. Servs., LLC v. Vidible, Inc., No. 14-1433, 2014 WL 
4209550, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2014) (“It appears that this ruling [Walden] 
could limit the Calder effects test.”); see also Mountain W., 2015 WL 4479490 at 
*5-6 (discussing competing rulings as to whether the Walden decision overruled 
the “purposeful direction prong” of the Calder test in the Ninth Circuit). 
 114.  See Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1123–24. 
 115.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984). 
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paper would have a significant effect where it was read.116  
On the other hand, the passive website created by the 
defendant is available to anyone, anywhere, so long as there 
is an Internet connection.  While it may be the case that there 
are more people viewing these images in California, and it 
may also be the case that the effects would be felt most 
strongly in California because Lawrence lives there, it is not 
the case that the defendant targeted California in any 
meaningful way compared to any other jurisdiction.117 Rather, 
the language of Walden is illustrative: jurisdiction cannot be 
based merely on the fortuitous residence of the plaintiff.118  If 
this basis for jurisdiction were sustained, then Lawrence 
could have alternatively brought suit in any other state in 
which she happened to reside and where individuals had 
viewed the images.119 This expansive interpretation of 
jurisdiction is contrary to the reasoning in Walden. 
Because no exception was made in Walden for Internet 
torts, and as the preceding considerations show, there is a 
real concern of at least inconsistent applicability of personal 
jurisdiction in cases like the hypothetical and at worst a 
finding that jurisdiction is not proper anywhere in the United 
States, leaving Lawrence without legal remedy.  None of the 
available frameworks—the traditional minimum contacts 
analysis, the Calder effects test, or the Zippo standard—are a 
proper fit for an age of cloud computing.  The reasoning in 
Walden, applied to the foregoing standards, strengthens the 
belief that jurisdiction will not be proper over the 
hypothetical defendant in this comment.  At least one 
scholarly article anticipated this problem before the Walden 
decision.120  The remainder of this Article assumes that the 
lack of a definite remedy is an undesirable outcome both 
because it may lead to inconsistencies and because it may 
lead to legitimate tort claims devoid of remedy.121 
 
 116.  Id. at 789. 
 117.  This is assuming that the website does not employ other interactivity 
that would make it especially targeted towards California. See supra Section 
III.B (discussing the application of the Zippo standard). 
 118.  Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1125. 
 119.  Id. (“Respondents would have experienced this same lack of access in 
California, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have traveled and found 
themselves wanting more money than they had.”). 
 120.  See generally Andrews & Newman, supra note 25. 
 121.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and 
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IV. SOLUTIONS 
The inability to obtain civil remedies for theft of data is 
an important policy issue worthy of scrutiny for a number of 
reasons.  First, the full range of the U.S. judicial system, 
including civil remedies, should discourage overt attempts to 
steal the data of U.S. citizens.  Second, victims of Internet 
attacks are worthy of particular sympathy because of our 
dependence on Internet services and the omnipresent threat 
posed by nefarious actors across the world.  Therefore, 
jurisdictional nets should be stretched to reach Internet 
tortfeasors.  Finally, gaps in judicial remedies are unfair to 
victims per se and extended jurisdiction would resolve these 
inequities.  Whatever the reason, there are a number of ways 
that the ambiguities or inadequate jurisdiction can be 
reduced or eliminated. 
A. Jurisdictional Reforms 
In 2013, two authors, Damon Andrews and John 
Newman, engaged directly with the application of personal 
jurisdiction to torts occurring in the cloud-computing 
sphere.122  Though there are some flaws to their proposals, 
they are useful starting points for considering solutions to the 
jurisdictional deficiencies described above. 
1. Caveat Maleficus Standard 
Under Andrews and Newman’s caveat maleficus 
approach, the location of Internet harm like data theft is 
based on the victim’s location.123  They root the reform in the 
tort notion of taking your victim “as they are” transformed to 
“taking the victim where they find him.”124 In our 
hypothetical example, this would mean that the defendant’s 
theft of data from a foreign data server creates jurisdiction in 
California because the injury was perpetrated against a 
person in California.125 The author’s justify this per se 
 
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and 
every injury its proper redress.”). 
 122.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 313–14. 
 123.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 362. 
 124.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 362, 364. 
 125.  In the original hypothetical it was suggested that Lawrence returned 
home to California after uploading the photos.  The caveat maleficus approach 
appears to be unavailing if the photos were stolen while Lawrence was still 
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jurisdictional hook because “cloud torts that involve the 
hacking of remote servers to obtain information are complex 
and sophisticated.”126 While this assertion is dubious in an 
age of cheap, accessible, and user-friendly data theft 
software,127 there are even more significant legal challenges 
to this framework. 
The foremost critique of this per se jurisdictional hook is 
that there is no basis for it in case law.  As the court 
emphasized in Walden when it discussed Internet torts, “the 
“minimum contacts” inquiry principally protects the liberty of 
the nonresident defendant, not the interests of the 
plaintiff.”128  A per se jurisdictional hook would be exceedingly 
plaintiff friendly.  In addition, such a broadly sweeping 
provision would allow for jurisdiction against the defendant 
based only on the plaintiff’s connection to the forum state—an 
outcome entirely at odds with the Walden decision’s rejection 
of fortuitous connections as a basis for jurisdiction. 
2. The Cloud as a Jurisdiction 
Andrews and Newman alternatively propose that the 
cloud could be established as its own area of jurisdiction with 
its own court.129  This new court would be reserved for “torts 
and crimes that occur in the cloud.”130 The authors point to 
the existence of specific jurisdiction courts like the Federal 
Appeals Court, which only covers patent-infringement suits 
as a model.131 This approach would remedy Walden’s rejection 
of plaintiff-based jurisdiction.132 Rather, the jurisdiction for 
the dispute would be based on the type of conduct, giving 
 
visiting Europe to film her new movie since the injury would then have occurred 
in Europe, despite the arbitrariness and inequity of this outcome.  See Andrews 
& Newman, supra note 25, at 363 n. 296 (showing the problem of caveat 
maleficus if the person is traveling when accident occurs). 
 126.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 363. 
 127.  Christina Warren, How I Hacked My Own iCloud Account, for Just 
$200, MASHABLE (Sept. 4, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/09/04/i-hacked-my-
own-icloud-account/. 
 128.  Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123. 
 129.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 364–65.  Andrews and 
Newman drew their inspiration for a court of cloud jurisdiction from similar 
arguments in David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of 
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
 130.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 364. 
 131.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 365. 
 132.  See Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1124. 
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sufficient notice to defendant that his activities would impose 
jurisdiction in the cloud court.133 
However, it would be difficult to define “torts and crimes 
that occur in the cloud” in such a way that the court of cloud 
jurisdiction did not swallow the affairs of all other competent 
courts.  Would such a standard capture all Internet activity 
that travels through an Internet company’s data servers?  In 
addition, would such a court necessarily create jurisdiction 
over actions occurring in foreign countries?  The geographical 
indefiniteness of the cloud means that it extends not only 
over domestic jurisdictions but also over foreign locales. 
Recent Supreme Court precedent has strongly disfavored the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.134  However, if 
jurisdiction were artificially constrained to not extend 
extraterritorially, then the hypothetical defendant in this 
case may escape jurisdiction and the cloud court will not have 
improved the outcome.  If, on the other hand, the court does 
extend its reach to foreign activities, the cloud court risks 
becoming a haven for the sort of F-cubed135 litigation—cases 
between foreign plaintiffs and defendants concerning events 
in foreign countries—that the Supreme Court has tried to 
discourage.136 
3. Reform of the Stored Communications Act 
Finally, Andrews and Newman propose reforms of the 
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) with updates for the 
modern digital age.137   The law was originally passed in 
1986138 and other critics have challenged the law for failing to 
keep pace with changes in the digital landscape.139  Andrews 
 
 133.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 365. 
 134.  Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) 
(“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it 
has none”). 
 135.  Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: Cabining the 
Extraterritorial Reach of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705 (2014) 
(“Basically, an F-cubed case involves a lawsuit brought in an American court by 
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign defendants, based on events that took place in 
some foreign country.”). 
 136.  See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 
(2013) (rejecting the use of the Alien Tort Statute for actions occurring outside 
of the territory of the United States). 
 137.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 366. 
 138.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2012). 
 139.  Illana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored 
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and Newman argue that the law should be updated.140  
However, they provide no specific guidance on how it might 
be reformed.141 
Despite the incompleteness of their argument and its 
dependence on legislative reform in an era of significant 
government recalcitrance, at least one judge has attempted to 
expand the scope of the SCA to reach foreign data centers.142  
In In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., Magistrate 
Judge James C. Francis held that the government was 
permitted to execute a search pursuant to the SCA to obtain 
information held by Microsoft in a data center in Ireland.143  
Ordinarily, such orders would violate the presumption 
against extraterritorial application.144  Absent authority 
pursuant to the SCA, the government would be required to 
obtain the fruits of the search pursuant to a Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty and no remedy would be possible in the 
absence of a treaty.145  Francis rebutted this presumption by 
noting, “the nationality principle   . . . supports the legal 
requirement that an entity subject to jurisdiction in the 
United States, like Microsoft, may be required to obtain 
evidence from abroad in connection with a criminal 
investigation.”146 
Though the Microsoft decision occurred in the context of 
warrants pursuant to the SCA for criminal actions, the 
reasoning could be reasonably extended to the civil context.  
Rather than determine jurisdiction based on the location of 
the data centers, the court could base jurisdiction on the 
location of the organization the defendant hacked.  In our 
hypothetical case, this would permit jurisdiction in California 
because it is where Apple is located.  Thus, a defendant 
hacking into Apple’s servers could reasonably anticipate 
being hailed into court where Apple does its business even if 
 
Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in 
the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 645 (2011). 
 140.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 366. 
 141.  See Andrews & Newman, supra note 26, at 366–67. 
 142.  In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & 
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 474–75. 
 146.  Id. at 476. 
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it hosts its data servers outside of California. 
Two problems remain.  First, Microsoft and a number of 
other cloud storage companies and advocates have vigorously 
challenged Judge Francis’s interpretation of the SCA.147  The 
Second Circuit conducted oral arguments in the case in 
September 2015.148  Even Congress has weighed in, proposing 
the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad 
(“LEADS”) Act,149 which would only permit extraterritorial 
data seizures of information belonging to a U.S. citizen or 
corporation (and finding that the corporations do not own for 
these purposes the data on their servers).  Even then, only if 
the seizure would not be in violation of the foreign country’s 
laws.150  Second, companies are increasingly outsourcing their 
storage to third party data centers.151  As a consequence, it 
may not always be clear to a hacker-defendant that his hack 
targeted Apple, or any other particular company, when he 
hacked the servers of a third party host.  Alternatively, the 
defendant may argue that he knowingly intended to hack the 
servers of the third party but not to hack Apple itself.  Such 
an argument might limit jurisdiction to where the third party 
does business as opposed to all of the places where Apple does 
business. 
 
 147.  See In re Warrant for Microsoft Email Stored in Dublin, Ireland, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, available at https://www.eff.org/cases/re-
warrant-microsoft-email-stored-dublin-ireland (database containing amicus 
briefs filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, AT&T, and Verizon, in 
support of Microsoft); see also Larry Seltzer & Zack Whittaker, Microsoft 
Refuses to Comply After Judge Revives Overseas Data Search Warrant, ZDNET 
(Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/judge-revives-microsoft-irish-data-
search-warrant-7000033144/. 
 148. Argument Calendar, Courtroom 1703, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, http://ww2.ca2.uscourts.gov/calendar/index.php?eID 
=735 (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).  
 149.  The Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad Act, S. 2871, 113th 
Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Sept. 18, 2014). 
 150.  John Ribiero, Senate Bill Would Limit Access to Emails Stored Abroad, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.computerworld.com/article/26 
86099/senate-bill-would-limit-access-to-emails-stored-abroad.html. 
 151.  Archana Venkatraman, Enterprises Spend More on Third-Party 
Datacentres Than In-house Ones: Uptime Survey, COMPUTER WEEKLY (Aug. 9, 
2013), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240203364/Enterprises-spend-mo
re-on-third-party-datacentres-than-in-house-ones-Uptime-survey. 
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B. Other Means of Establishing Jurisdiction 
1. International Collaboration 
International collaboration on a comprehensive 
jurisdictional framework may be the most ideal solution to 
our hypothetical.  It could not only resolve questions of 
jurisdiction but also remedy related challenges of service of 
process and judgment collection against a foreign defendant.  
While those other facets of civil procedure are beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is important to acknowledge that even 
if Lawrence could establish personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, it would be difficult to hail the defendant into 
court or exercise a default judgment if the defendant declined 
to appear (and potentially subject himself to jurisdiction) 
without a comprehensive international framework. 
However, there are significant barriers to the adoption of 
a uniform international standard for data privacy.  Countries 
operate in a patchwork of national rules governing data 
protection.152  While the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development agreed on a framework for 
cooperation in the enforcement of privacy laws in 2007,153 
countries continue to develop competing data privacy 
frameworks that are fundamentally at odds.154  Consequently, 
international collaboration on data privacy rules represents 
more of an aspiration than a concrete solution to the 
increasing challenges of international Internet torts. 
2. Fact-Specific Arguments 
All of the previously suggested solutions to the personal 
jurisdiction gap in Internet torts have depended on 
 
 152.  John J. Schulze, Jr., Caveat E-Emptor: Solutions to the Jurisdictional 
Problem of Internet Injury, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 627–32 (2006) 
(reviewing the data privacy rules for a variety of different countries and how 
they relate to U.S. data privacy law). 
 153.  OECD Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the 
Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy, OECD: INTERNET ECONOMY, 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdrecommendationoncross-borderco-
operationintheenforcementoflawsprotectingprivacy.htm. 
 154.  Donald C. Dowling, Jr., European Union data protection law and US-
based multinational banks: a compliance primer, WHITE & CASE CLIENT ALERT, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=056dbb01-0a69-46b6-85f1-
ac7b8868b18f (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (“The European approach in effect 
prioritizes privacy over free speech, while the U.S. in effect does the reverse.”). 
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interventions in the law-making process, greater cooperation 
between nations, or debatable judicial interpretation.  
Therefore, the most favorable option may be a careful 
construction of facts that allow the Calder or Zippo tests to 
serve as a basis of jurisdiction. 
The Calder test may be applicable if Lawrence can show 
two things: (1) that the torts she alleges are, like libel, 
dependent on the experience of harm in the forum state;155 
and (2) that the defendant intended or should have known 
that the effects of his tort would be felt in the forum state.156  
Therefore, a court could find that the privacy torts in our 
hypothetical fall within a special class, like the claims in 
Calder, which justify a unique jurisdictional treatment. 
The Zippo test may be used to reinforce the assertion 
that the defendant knew that he was targeting California or 
as a standalone basis for establishing jurisdiction.157  In this 
case, the key factual considerations will be the extent to 
which the author monetized the product through interaction 
with California residents or specifically interacted with 
residents of that state.158  If, for instance, the defendant uses 
the release of the images to extort Lawrence in exchange for 
removal of the images, then a court could find that the 
defendant had directed the claims at the forum state.159  
However, the targeting of the forum state must be evident in 
 
 155.  See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984); see also Myers v. Bennett 
Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding in a FCRA claim that mental 
distress is felt where plaintiff resides thereby establishing jurisdiction over 
defendant who induced the mental distress). 
 156.  See Calder, 465 U.S. 783. But see Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Bird, 683 
F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Ariz. 2010) (finding no personal jurisdiction over 
defendants because knowledge of plaintiff’s place of residence, without more, 
insufficient to satisfy express-aiming prong of Calder effects test). 
 157.  In fact courts grapple with the difficult interplay between these two 
tests when it comes to intentional torts. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 
472 n.30 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We need not decide today whether or not a ‘Zippo-
passive’ site could still give rise to personal jurisdiction under Calder, and 
reserve this difficult question for another time.”). 
 158.  See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27 
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (“If Dot Com had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania, the solution would have been simple—it could have chosen not to 
sell its services to Pennsylvania residents.”). 
 159.  See, e.g., Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 
1998) (finding that a defendant targeted plaintiffs by squatting on a website 
using the plaintiff’s name and then extorting the plaintiff in exchange for 
relinquishing the site). 
01_SCHILDKNECHT FINAL 12/20/2015  10:02 PM 
2016] JUSTICE FOR J-LAW?  31 
addition to the online activity.160 Lawrence could additionally 
argue that the thief established contacts with California by 
posting images on the Internet knowing that the person most 
affected (Lawrence) resided in the forum,161 or that persons in 
California were particularly likely to make use of the images 
on the website.  In Pavlovich, the California Supreme Court 
left the latter legal argument open when it relied in part on 
the fact that “there is no evidence that any California 
resident ever visited, much less downloaded the DeCSS 
source code from, the LiVid Web site.”162  If Lawrence could 
show that users in California most often downloaded the 
images of her, then she may be able to claim that the site was 
interactive vis-à-vis the forum state.  Because one purpose of 
a passive image-hosting site is to encourage the distribution 
and downloading of those images, the “interactivity” would be 
the very encouragement for California residents to download 
the images for themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Considering the prompt legal action by Jennifer 
Lawrence and other celebrities to limit harms suffered by the 
release of their private photographs, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that suits for damages will be forthcoming.  When 
those suits come, the celebrities will face a difficult challenge 
establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant(s), 
especially if the defendants are foreign citizens. Increased 
reliance on cloud-based Internet services has resulted in the 
storage of Internet data in locales around the world.  In 
addition, Internet data theft can be effortlessly perpetrated 
without regard for traditional jurisdictional borders.  In fact, 
the entire celebrity photo hack could have occurred without 
any contact with the U.S. 
The challenges faced by victims of Internet torts are 
 
 160.  Dinar Corp. Inc. v. Sterling Currency Grp., LLC, 2:13-CV-02106-APG, 
2014 WL 4072023 (D. Nev. Aug. 15, 2014) (“[T]he cases finding ‘something more’ 
[connecting defendant’s actions to the forum state] focus on actions targeted at 
the forum taken in addition to the online activity.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., Brayton Purcell, L.L.P. v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 
1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that jurisdiction was proper where the 
advertiser knew that they were infringing the work of a resident of the forum 
state); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320–22 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 162.  Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 276 (2002). 
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exacerbated by the lack of clear judicial guidance.  In Walden 
v. Fiore respondents advised the Supreme Court that their 
decision could have far reaching implications for jurisdiction 
in Internet torts.  The Court’s disregard for this concern 
leaves a figurative cloud of uncertainty hanging over personal 
jurisdiction in the digital cloud, especially for precipitating 
Internet tort cases like those posed in our hypothetical.  
Furthermore, the prior court tests established in Calder and 
Zippo are, following Walden, at best fraught with ambiguity, 
and at worst support a finding of no jurisdiction.  Therefore, 
foreign citizens committing acts that affect the United States 
may leave victims of their crimes to depend on changes to 
national or international legal norms or particularly 
beneficial facts in order to avoid the pressing problems of 
obtaining relief from Internet torts. 
 
